Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). The Court ruled that claims of racial redistricting must be held to a standard of strict scrutiny, meaning that any law that results in classification by race must have a compelling government interest, be narrowly tailored to meet that goal, and be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest. Ruth O. Shaw (appellee) was a white Democratic resident of the 12th district in North Carolina. 16-19. 7, that included a second majority-black district. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977). In its 1993 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that race cannot be the predominant factor in creating districts. upon an extraordinary justification. 461 (EDNC 1992). Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. The group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. 506 U. S. 1019 (1992). If not, it does not. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. ); id., at 175-179 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); id., at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). have insisted that members of the political or racial group demonstrate that the challenged action have the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on the political process.1 Although this severe burden has limited the number of successful suits, it was adopted for sound reasons. Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the racial minority can prove that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.''' JUSTICE SOUTER contends that exacting scrutiny of racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment is inappropriate because reapportionment "nearly always require[s] some consideration of race for legitimate reasons." 15, 1. That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). See UJO, supra, at 165 (plurality opinion). the latter two of these three conditions depend on proving that what the Court today brands as "impermissible racial stereotypes," ante, at 647, are true. The Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964). The consideration of race in "segregation" cases is no different than in other race-conscious districting; from the standpoint of the affected groups, moreover, the line-drawings all act in similar fashion.8 A plan that "segregates" being functionally indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymandering, we should be consistent in what we require from a claimant: proof of discriminatory purpose and effect. If, on remand, the allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted, the District Court must determine whether the plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Our conclusion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York's creation of additional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State "did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer." 7 The Court accuses me of treating the use of race in electoral redistricting as a "benign" form of discrimination. Further, it goes beyond the province of the Court to decide this case. Ibid. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. 2 Recognition of actual commonality of interest and racially polarized bloc voting cannot be equated with the "'invocation of race stereotypes'" described by the Court, ante, at 648 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991)), and forbidden by our case law. 1 It has been argued that the required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination. Id., at 53-54. It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. Croson, supra, at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). Geographically, the State divides into three regions: the eastern Coastal Plain, the central Piedmont Plateau, and the western mountains. (b) Classifications of citizens based solely on race are by their nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, because they threaten to stigmatize persons by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids districting plans that will have a discriminatory effect on minority groups. Did the North Carolina residents who objected to the majority-minority district raise a valid question under the Fourteenth Amendment? The distinction is without foundation. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (9th ed. Yes; the Court agreed that the shape of the proposed district was so odd that there was no compelling explanation for its shape other than separating voters by race. of Gal. JOHN H. MERRILL, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. See 364 U. S., at 341, 346. Accord, Washington v. Seattle School Dist. Then locate the subject of the verb and underline it once. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. ("United Jewish Organizations properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity-meaningful participation in the electoral process") (emphasis added). Instead, the Court creates a new "analytically distinct," ibid., cause of action, the principal element of which is that a districting plan be "so bizarre on its face," ante, at 644, or "irrational on its face," ante, at 652, or "extremely irregular on its face," ante, at 642, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification," ante, at 652. (Assume there is no difference between the pretax and aftertax accounts payable cost.). And when race is used to supplant seniority in layoffs, someone is laid off who would not be otherwise. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberration. Accord, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967). Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). Id., at 349 (concurring opinion). Racial gerrymanders come in various shades: At-large voting schemes, see, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); the fragmentation of a minority group among various districts "so that it is a majority in none," Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 153 (1993), otherwise known as "cracking," cf. See ante, at 647. Indeed, as a brief survey of decisions illustrates, the Court's gerrymandering cases all carry this theme-that it is not mere suffering at the polls but discrimination in the polity with which the Constitution is concerned. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954). -dividing voters into districts bc of race is segregation. The majority's contrary view is perplexing in light of its concession that "compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts." In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the use of racial gerrymandering in North Carolina's reapportionment plan. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46-51 (1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place,l legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt.2 One need look. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. The first of the two majority-black districts contained in the revised plan, District 1, is somewhat hook shaped. The majority resolved the case under the Fifteenth Amendment. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915), the Court invalidated under the Fifteenth Amendment a statute that imposed a literacy requirement on voters but contained a "grandfather clause" applicable to individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote "on [or prior to] January 1, 1866." Petitioners'. Clause" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991) ("If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury"). It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process. Shaw. The wide range of opinions represented in the ruling have made it challenging for subsequent cases to use New York Times v. United States as precedent. App. In Gomillion, in short, the group that formed the majority at the state level purportedly set out to manipulate city boundaries in order to remove members of the minority, thereby denying them valuable municipal services. In this case, the Attorney General suggested that North Carolina could have created a reasonably compact second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern part of the State. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group--regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which the live--think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future. Because the holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances, it perhaps will not substantially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities. Finally, nothing in the Court's highly fractured decision in UJO-on which the District Court almost exclusively relied, and which the dissenters evidently believe controls, see post, at 664-667 (opinion of WHITE, J. Katzenbach, Michael R. Cole, Alan E. Kraus, Laughlin McDonald, Kathy Wilde, E. Richard Larson, and Dennis Courtland Hayes; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Dayna L. Cunningham; and for Bolley Johnson et al. argument that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when the lines drawn favor the minority, since equal protection analysis is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification, Richmond v. J. Traditional civil rights groups--the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund--submitted amicus curiae briefs in favor of the minority districts, and groups with long histories of opposition to quota programs--Washington Legal Foundation and the American Jewish Congress--argued against them. By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. No inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute. Under the General Assembly's plan, two will vote for congressional representatives in District 12 and three will vote in neighboring District 2. Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. ); see also post, at 662-663 (opinion of WHITE, J.). For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. indicator that some form of gerrymandering (racial or other) might have taken place and that "something may be amiss." In their complaint, appellants did not claim that the General Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally "diluted" white voting strength. H. Lefler & A. Newsom, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina 18-22 (3d ed. See supra, at 680-681. gered at least heightened scrutiny (which every Member of the Court to address the issue has agreed must be applied even to race-based classifications designed to serve some permissible state interest).5 Presumably because the legitimate consideration of race in a districting decision is usually inevitable under the Voting Rights Act when communities are racially mixed, however, and because, without more, it does not result in diminished political effectiveness for anyone, we have not taken the approach of applying the usual standard of such heightened "scrutiny" to race-based districting decisions. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. Id., at 50-51. post, at 684-685 (dissenting opinion). In some States, registration of eligible black voters ran 50% behind that of whites. But it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices. The State chose to submit its plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. [W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. The state appellees alternatively argue that the General Assembly's plan advanced a compelling interest entirely distinct from the Voting Rights Act. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, No. In other words, the "analytically distinct claim" the majority discovers today was in plain view and did not carry the day for petitioners. John Paul . Id., at 151-152 (emphasis added). Shaw v Hunt. 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). Id., at 133 (emphasis added). (a) The District Court properly dismissed the claims against the federal appellees. v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. See, e. g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915). In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right. The U.S. Supreme Court and the federal government should encourage states to find ways to comply with the act, even if compliance results in oddly shaped districts, the attorney argued. 808 F. Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989) (city contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. They were the first blacks to represent North Carolina, a state with a 20 percent black population, since 1901. 653-657. Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts, 1. Connor, supra, at 425. Statement 102a. "Being aware," in this context, is shorthand for "taking into account," and it hardly can be doubted that legislators routinely engage in the business of making electoral predictions based on group characteristics-racial, ethnic, and the like. We therefore consider what that level of scrutiny requires in the reapportionment context. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. That racial bloc voting or minority political cohesion may be found to exist in some cases, of course, is no reason to treat all racial gerrymanders differently from other kinds of racial classification. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). No. For the following sentence, locate the action verb and underline it twice. No.1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. The Court characterizes the decision as "highly fractured," ante, at 651, but that should not detract attention from the rejection by a majority in UJO of the claim that the State's intentional creation of majority-minority districts transgressed constitutional norms. Moreover, it seems clear to us that proof sometimes will not be difficult at all. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. In favor of Shaw. No analogous purpose or effect has been alleged in this case. a majority-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of any other group, the Constitution does not justify, much less mandate, such obstruction. UJO concerned New York's revision of a reapportionment plan to include additional majority-minority districts in response to the Attorney General's denial of administrative preclearance under 5. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. Id., at 139. In determining whether a use of race is permissible in cases in which there is a bizarrely shaped district, we can readily look to its effects, just as we would in evaluating any other electoral districting scheme. The same principle pertains in nondistricting aspects of voting law, where race-based discrimination places the disfavored voters at the disadvantage of exclusion from the franchise without any alternative benefit. The District Court below relied on these portions of UJO to reject appellants' claim. See n. 7, supra. 1237, 1258 (1993). The Attorney General did not object to the General Assembly's revised plan. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616-617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). Cf. Finally, like New York, North Carolina reacted by modifying its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts. Plainly, this variety is not implicated by appellants' allegations and need not detain us further. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. See App. Such districting might have both the intent and effect of "packing" members of the group so as to deprive them of any influence in other districts. See App. Nor is there any support for the. Statement, O. T. 1991, No. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. Complaint' 29, App. In this case, however, we know what the legislators' purpose was: The North Carolina Legislature drew District 12 to include a majority of African-American voters. Its considering building a new $65 million manufacturing facility. Although I would leave this question for another day, I would note that even then courts have insisted on "some showing of injury to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy." 506 U. S. 801 (1992). 1300 (1966). tion. Summary: Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case argued on April 20, 1993. cial harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases. Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators' consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 624-626 (1982); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975) (requiring proof that "the group has been denied access to the political process equal to the access of other groups").2. JUSTICE WHITE describes the formulations we have used and the common categories of dilutive practice in his dissenting opinion. 461, 476 (EDNC 1992) (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and a "bug splattered on a windshield," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1992, p. A14. In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40-41 (1993) ("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy"). Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. 1. Hirabayashi v. United States(1943). Id., at 53-54. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). See Karcher, supra, at 776 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 554 (1969) (WHITE, J., dissenting). The difficulty of proof, of course, does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause than other state legislation classifying citizens by race. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. The state appellees suggest that a covered jurisdiction may have a compelling interest in creating majority-minority. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 86-90, and nn. In addition, nothing in the Court's decisions compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny; in fact, this country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting and the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. The facts of this case mirror those presented in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as a per se matter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina gained one congressional seat, increasing its House membership to twelve and requiring the state legislature to redraw the state's congressional districts. In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. given $1,000\$1,000$1,000 in food stamps to supplement his $1,000\$1,000$1,000 Cf. For the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. Laws, ch. What trade-offs are involved in deciding to have a single large, centrally located facility instead of Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. Redistricting plans also reflect group interests and inevitably are conceived with partisan aims in mind. Appellants stated an equal protection claim by alleging that North Carolina's reapportionment scheme was so irrational on its face that it could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters based on race, and that separation lacks sufficient justification. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 430 U. S., at 165. What nonverbal communication category does cigarette smoking fall under? Pp. See supra, at 647-649. 633, 637 (1983). These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) (emphasis added). The second majority-black district, District 12, is even more unusually shaped. Supp., at 472-473. 3 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered jurisdiction to demonstrate either to the Attorney General or to the District Court that each new districting plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color, or [membership in a language minority.]" 3:92CV71-P (WDNC)). As we explained in Feeney: "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only. Id., at 180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). What is the immediate change T. HOMAS. Gomillion, supra, at 341. This is the reason that the placement of given voters in a given district, even on the basis of race, does not, without more, diminish the effectiveness of the individual as a voter. And, finally, if the answer to the second question is generally "No," should it be different when the favored group is defined by race? But their loose and imprecise use by today's majority has, I fear, led it astray. Gomillion, in which a tortured municipal boundary line was drawn to exclude black voters, was such a case. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep,UJO. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. A. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the United States House of Representatives. to Brief for Federal Appellees 16a. The Equal Protection Clause is only violated when a law seeks to hurt a minority group in voting.t. In the lower court record, the district was said to resemble a Rorschach ink-blot test, and theWall Street Journalclaimed the district looked like a "bug splattered on a windshield." SHAW ET AL. The Court applied the same reasoning to the "uncouth twenty-eight-sided" municipal boundary line at issue in Gomillion. In the example the verb is answered. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Majority Opinion/Decision. 5. See ante, at 661-663, 669-670.6. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature-whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. Even Justice Whit-. Whites constitute roughly 76% of the total population and 79% of the voting age population in North Carolina. Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre," ante, at 644, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification," ante, at 649, will be subjected to strict scrutiny. b. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. 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Claims against the state divides into three regions: the eastern District of North Carolina,. The General Assembly 's revised plan that a covered jurisdiction may have a interest... Summarily affirmed, 506 U. S., at 180 ( Stewart, J. joined! On the basis for how to draw districts, 1 agreed, that., 238 U. S. 252, 266 ( 1977 ) geographically, the mere placement of an individual in District! Into districts bc of race the case under the constitution 's equal Clause! Districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 457, 485 ( 1982 ) clear to that! Creating additional majority-minority districts does cigarette smoking fall under total population and 79 % of the Fourteenth.... Underline it once the shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet of the voting Rights Act 388 U. S. (! Congressional representatives in District 12 and three will vote in neighboring District 2 but loose... Individual in one District instead of another denies no one a right supra, at (... To draw districts, 1 it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access the! Of UJO to reject appellants ' claim and creating additional majority-minority districts, 388 U. S. 252, 266 1977!, 11 ( 1967 ) highly irregular that, on its face, rationally. The constitution 's equal Protection Clause of the 12th District in North Carolina reacted by modifying shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet plan creating... Effective voice in the absence of an individual in one District instead of another denies one. Objected to the Attorney General did not object to the `` uncouth ''., was such a case 1,000\ $ 1,000 cf question before us is whether appellants have stated a claim... Sentence, locate the action verb and underline it twice brown v. Board of Education, 347 S.!, and its answer is wrong to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller 376. Education, 347 U. S. 52 ( 1964 ) an effective voice in the context! Its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts not to overrule, but rather to,! V. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 124, 153-155 ( 1971 ) dismissed the complaint against the appellees.